

Message Text

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ACTION EUR-25

INFO OCT-01 IO-14 ISO-00 CIAE-00 PM-07 INR-10 L-03 NSAE-00

PA-04 RSC-01 PRS-01 SP-03 USIA-15 SAJ-01 TRSY-11 SS-20

NSC-07 DODE-00 CU-04 ACDA-19 OMB-01 NEA-10 OIC-04

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FM USMISSION NATO

TO SECSTATE WASHDC 5274

INFO ALL NATO CAPITALS 3895

USDOCOSOUTH

USMISSION GENEVA

USMISSION EC BRUSSELS

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 1 OF 2 USNATO 2160

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: PFOR, NATO

SUBJ: CSCE: U.S. STATEMENT ON TREATMENT OF MEDITERRANEAN IN
CSCE DOCUMENTS

GENEVA FOR USDEL CSCE

1. SUMMARY: DURING GENERAL DISCUSSION OF CSCE ISSUES IN APR 22
NAC (SEPTTEL), SHERER (US) GAVE STATEMENT EXPLAINING IN FULL
STRONG US RESERVATIONS ABOUT EC PREFERENCE FOR A SEPARATE
DOCUMENT ON MEDITERRANEAN ISSUES. TEXT OF THIS STATEMENT FOLLOWS:
END SUMMARY

2. BEGIN TEXT:

MR. CHAIRMAN, IT HAS BEEN SUGGESTED TO ME THAT A MORE DETAILED
EXPLANATION OF OUR POSITION ON THE TREATMENT OF THE MEDITERRANEAN
IN THE FINAL CSCE DOCUMENTS MIGHT BE HELPFUL. I HAVE GIVEN SUCH
AN EXPLANATION TO THE NATO DELEGATION HEADS' CAUCUS IN GENEVA,
AND WOULD BE GLAD TO REPEAT IT HERE, IF THAT IS THE GENERAL DESIRE.
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FIRSTLY, THE CSCE SPENT A VERY LONG TIME DISCUSSING IN
HELSINKI HOW THE MEDITERRANEAN WOULD BE TREATED. SOME DELEGATIONS
WANTED THEN TO HAVE IT FIGURE AS AN AGENDA ITEM UNTO ITSELF.
THE RESULT OF A LONG AND DIFFICULT COMPROMISE WAS THAT IT WOULD

BE TREATED AS AN ASPECT, BUT AS ONLY ONE ASPECT, OF THE AGENDA ITEMS ON SECURITY AND ECONOMIC COOPERATION. WE THINK THIS IS THE CORRECT TREATMENT, SINCE THE CONFERENCE IS, AND SHOULD BE, PRIMARILY FOCUSED ON EUEOPE. WE FEEL CSCE HAS QUITE ENOUGH PROBLEMS TO DEAL WITH IN EUROPE ITSELF WITHOUT ATTEMPTING TO COVER OTHER SUBJECTS WHICH ARE IMPORTANT IN THEMSELVES. BUT WHETHER WE ALL AGREE THAT THIS TREATMENT IS THE BEST ONE, THE FACT IS THAT WE NOW HAVE AN AGENDA APPROVED BY 35 FOREIGN MINISTERS. WE BELIEVE EVERY COUNTRY REPRESENTED HERE HAS AN INTEREST IN MAINTAINING THE INTEGRITY OF THIS AGENDA. MOST OF US HAVE AT ONE TIME OR ANOTHER REFERRED TO THE AGENDA TO SUPPORT OUR POSITIONS - FOR EXAMPLE, GREECE HAS USED THE AGENDA TO ARGUE THAT THE YUGOSLAV PROPOSAL ON MINORITIES SHOULD BE TREATED UNDER BASKET III, AND WE ALL USED THE AGENDA TO ARGUE THAT THERE SHOULD BE NO PREAMBLE TO BASKET III. SINCE THE HELSINKI BLUE BOOK IS THE ONLY SET OF GUIDELINES IN CSCE, WE BELIEVE WE HAVE AN OVERRIDING INTEREST IN MAINTAINING IT. THE ITALIAN PROPOSAL TO TREAT THE MEDITERRANEAN GOBALLY, AS A SEPARATE QUESTION, WOULD BE TANTAMOUNT TO EXTABLISHING IT AS A SEPARATE AGENDA ITEM, IN CONTRADICTION TO THE HELSINKI RECOMMENDATIONS. WE THINK THIS WOULD SHIFT THE EUROPEAN FOCUS OF CSCE TO AN AREA WHICH IS NOT ENTIRELY EUROPEAN, WITH ALL OF THE IMPLICATIONS OF SUCH A SHIFT IN FOCUS. IT WOULD ALSO OPEN THE DOOR TO ALL THE SPECIAL PLEADERS WHICH THE CONFERENCE HAS THUS FAR MANAGED TO DISCOURAGE, WITH UNPREDICTABLE RESULTS.

SECONDLY, AND AGAIN AFTER LONG AND DIFFUCULT DISCUSSIONS, THE CSCE REACHED A GENTLEMAN'S AGREEMENT THAT THE RETURN VISITS BY THE NON-PARTICIPATING MEDITERRANEAN COUNTRIES WOULD CONCLUDE THE PROCESS OF CONSULTATION WITH THEM. THIS AGREEMENT IS RECORDED IN THE JOURNAL OF THE JOINT MEETING OF COMMITTEES I AND II ON JAN 31, 1974. WE THINK THAT THIS AGREEMENT WAS EXTREMELY FAIR, AND MOST APPROPRIATE. IN TERMS OF OFFICIAL MEETINGS ALONE, THE CSCE HAS SPENT OF 4,000 MAN-HOURS LISTENING TO THE MEDITERRANEAN COUNTRIES; THIS IS NORE TIME THAN WE HAVE SPENT DISCUSSING ANY ONE OF OUR OWN FREER MOVEMENT PROPOSALS. AS IS WELL KNOWN, THE US HAS BENT OVER BACKWARDS TO ALLOW THE MEDITERRANEAN COUNTRIES A CONFIDENTIAL

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FAIR HEARING, BUT WE FEEL ENOUGH IS ENOUGH. FURTHERMORE, WE BELIEVE THE NATO COUNTRIES HAVE AN OVER-RIDING INTEREST IN SEEING TO IT THAT ALL THE CSCE COUNTRIES, AND FIRST OF ALL WE OURSELVES, STICK TO AGREEMENTS REACHED IN CSCE, AND WE FOR OUR PART, INTEND TO STICK TO THIS GENTLEMAN'S AGREEMENT, AS WELL AS TO THE HELSINKI BLUE BOOK. WE THINK THE INFORMAL CONSULTATIONS WHICH HAVE TAKEN PLACE WITH THE ARAB COUNTRIES ARE IN VIOLATION OF THE SPIRIT, AND PERHAPS ALSO THE LETTER, OF THIS GENETLEMAN'S AGREEMENT, AND HAVE VERY SERIOUS IMPLICATIONS INDEED.

AFTER CAREFUL CONSIDERATION, WE ARE CONVINCED THAT A GENERAL DECLARATION ON THE MEDITERRANEAN COULD NOT BE ISSUED BY CSCE WITHOUT CONSULTING ALL MEDITERRANEAN COUNTRIES ON ITS CONTENT, ANY MORE THAN THE USSR AND POLAND COULD ISSUE A GENERAL DECLARATION

ON THE BALTIC WITHOUT CONSULTING THE OTHER BALTIC STATES.
IN FACT, SOME MEDITERRANEAN COUNTRIES HAVE ALREADY MADE CLEAR THEIR
DESIRE TO BE CONSULTED; THE ALGERIAN AND TUNISIAN REPRESENTATIVES
HAVE SAID THEY WOULD LIKE TO "HAVE A LOOK AT THE WORDING" OF A
MEDITERRANEAN DECLARATION BEFORE IT IS ISSUED, AND WE BELIEVE IT
IS SIMPLE POLITICAL REALISM TO ASSUME THAT SUCH CLEARANCE WOULD
BE FELT NECESSARY. ALL THIS RAISES AGAIN THE UNFORTUNATE PROBLEMS
OF PARTICIPATION: HOW ARE CONSULTATIONS TO BE CONDUCTED, AND BY
WHOM? WHO IS TO PREVENT THESE CONSULTATIONS FROM DETERIORATING
INTO AN ARAB-ISRAELI PROPAGANDA BATTLE? WHO IS TO ASSURE FAIR
TREATMENT FOR THE ISRAELIS? WHAT ABOUT THE ARAB COUNTRIES WHO
ARE NOT EVEN CONTRIBUTORS TO CSCE?

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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 2 OF 2 USNATO 2160

GENEVA FOR USDEL CSCE

THIS PROCESS INEVITABLY RAISES FURTHER, AND EVEN MORE DIFFICULT
QUESTIONS, ON WHICH THE ARAB COUNTRIES, PROBABLY BECAUSE THEY WERE
PROMPTED, HAVE ALREADY EXPRESSED THEIR INTEREST: HOW WOULD THE
MEDITERRANEAN COUNTRIES ADHERE TO THE MEDITERRANEAN DECLARATION?
WOULD THIS NOT MEAN PRESENCE OR SOME OTHER RELATIONSHIP, WITH THE
THIRD PHASE? WOULD NOT A MEDITERRANEAN DECLARATION OPEN UP THE
QUESTION OF THEIR PARTICIPATION IN CSCE FOLLOW-UP? IT IS ALL
VERY WELL TO SAY THAT THESE THINGS WOULD BE OUT OF THE QUESTION,
BUT FRANKLY WE HAVE NOT SEEN ANY INCLINATION IN GENEVA TO DRAW THE
LINE, AND WE WOULD EXPECT CONTINUED SLIPPAGE IN THIS DIRECTION.
IN FACT, ONE WESTERN COUNTRY - SWITZERLAND - HAS PUBLICLY ASKED
THE ARABS' WHAT ROLE THEY WOULD FORESEE FOR THEMSELVES IN THE
CSCE FOLLOW-UP.

IT HAS BEEN EXPLAINED TO US THAT THE REAL REASON FOR THE ITALIAN INITIATIVE WAS TO PRE-EMPT OTHER, MORE EXTREME, PROPOSALS. FOR OUR PART, WE HAVE NOT SEEN ANY OVERWHELMING DESIRE TO DISCUSS THE SUBSTANCE OF THE MEDITERRANEAN IN THE WORKING BODIES OF THE CONFIDENTIAL

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CONFERENCE UP TO NOW, AND SO WE ARE NOT AWARE OF WHAT OUR ITALIAN FRIENDS ARE TRYING TO PRE-EMPT. MOREOVER, WE BELIEVE THAT ANY INITIATIVES WILL BE MANAGEABLE, AS LONG AS THE HELSINKI RECOMMENDATIONS REMAIN INTACT AS A GUIDELINE AND AS A LIMITATION. IT IS PRECISELY IN ABANDONING THESE RECOMMENDATIONS THAT WE ENTER UNCHARTERED, AND THEREFORE DANGEROUS WATERS. FURTHERMORE, WE ARE CONVINCED THAT, QUITE THE CONTRARY TO PRE-EMPTING ANYTHING, THE ITALIAN PROPOSAL, ESPECIALLY COMING FROM THE NINE, WOULD HAVE THE EFFECT OF WHETTING THE APPETITES OF THE ARAB COUNTRIES FOR AN EVEN GREATER ROLE IN CSCE. EVENTS IN GENEVA HAVE SHOWN THE ARAB DESIRE TO INFLUENCE THE CONDUCT OF CSCE - AS FOR INSTANCE WHEN THEY REFUSED TO APPEAR BECAUSE PORTUGAL WAS CHAIRING A MEETING - AND THE CORRESPONDING INABILITY OF THE CSCE TO RESPOND WITH ANY SEMBLANCE OF FAIRNESS OR OBJECTIVITY - AS FOR EXAMPLE WHEN THE ARAB COUNTRIES WERE QUESTIONED IN A MOST FORTHCOMING AND FRIENDLY MANNER ON MEDITERRANEAN SECURITY, WHILE THE ISRAELI AMBASSADOR WAS GREETED WITH STONY SILENCE.

IT IS FOR ALL THESE REASONS THAT WE BELIEVE IT IS IRRESPONSIBLE TO DISCUSS THE IDEA OF A GENERAL DECLARATION ON THE MEDITERRANEAN WITH THE NON-PARTICIPATING MEDITERRANEAN STATES BEFORE WE HAVE COME TO AN AGREED NATO POSITION ON THE TREATMENT OF THE MEDITERRANEAN IN THE FINAL CSCE DOCUMENTS. AFTER ALL, WE IN THE US FEEL WE HAVE SOME SMALL INTEREST IN THE MEDITERRANEAN, AS REPRESENTED BY THE PRESENCE OF THE SIXTH FLEET. NEED I REMIND ANYONE HERE THAT THIS FLEET IS ALSO A NATO FLEET WHICH IS THERE TO PROTECT NATO INTERESTS AS WELL AS US INTERESTS? IT WOULD BE IN KEEPING WITH THE SPIRIT OF THIS ALLIANCE TO DISCUSS THIS QUESTION FULLY WITHIN NATO BEFORE DOING SO WITH OTHER COUNTRIES, AND WE WOULD HOPE TO BE ABLE TO ARRIVE AT AN AGREED NATO POSITION ON THE TREATMENT OF THE MEDITERRANEAN BEFORE ANY DISCUSSION OF THE MATTER IS HELD IN CSCE.

FOR OUR PART, WE BELIEVE IT IS POSSIBLE TO FIND THE BASIS FOR SUCH AGREEMENT, PROVIDED WE STICK WITHIN THE LIMITATIONS OF THE HELSINKI RECOMMENDATIONS AND THE CSCE GENTELAN'S AGREEMENT ON CONSULTATION WITH THE MEDITERRANEAN COUNTRIES. WE HAVE REACHED THIS CONCLUSION PRIMARILY BECAUSE MUCH OF THE LANGUAGE CONTAINED IN THE ITALIAN DRAFT DECLARATION WOULD BE ACCEPTABLE TO US UNDER THE APPROPRIATE AGENDA ITEMS. IN SAYING THIS I WOULD NOTE TWO GENERAL AREAS WHICH ARE OF CONCERN TO US: FIRST, THE OVERALL CONFIDENTIAL

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EUROPE-MEDITERRANEAN SLANT OF THE PAPER, WHICH WE DO NOT FEEL IS

ENTIRELY IN KEEPING WITH THE FACT OF NORTH AMERICAN PARTICIPATION AND THE FUNDAMENTAL CSCE RULE OF EQUALITY AMONG THE PARTICIPANTS. THIS SLANT IS ESPECIALLY NOTABLE IN THE ECONOMIC AREAS, BUT COULD BE CORRECTED THROUGH SIMPLE DRAFTING CHANGES. SECONDLY, WE DO NOT BELIEVE THE NATO COUNTRIES HAVE ANY INTEREST IN OPENING A DISCUSSION OF THE "CAUSES OF TENSION" IN THE MEDITERRANEAN AREA, SINCE THIS WOULD IMMEDIATELY POSE THE QUESTION OF WHAT ARE THE CAUSES OF TENSION? AS WE UNDERSTAND IT, THIS CODE PHRASE COULD BE TAKEN TO MEAN TO EXISTENCE OF ISRAEL OR THE ARAB DESIRE TO ELIMINATE ISRAEL; THE PRESENCE OF THE SOVIET FLEET OR THE PRESENT OF THE US FLEET; THE CYPRUS PROBLEM; THE ITALO-YUGOSLAV FRONTIER DISPUTE; OR EVEN SPANISH CLAIMS TO GIBRALTAR. DISCUSSION OF ANY OF THESE SUBJECTS IN CSCE, OR ESPECIALLY WITH THE NON-PARTICIPATING MEDITERRANEAN STATES, WOULD BE SOMEWHAT DELICATE, TO SAY THE LEAST.

WE WOULD HOPE, THEREFORE, THAT SOME WAY COULD BE FOUND TO MODIFY THE PRESENT LANGUAGE OF THE DECLARATION, DIVIDE IT UP BETWEEN AGENDA ITEMS I AND II, AND INTRODUCE IT AS APPROPRIATE WITHIN THESE TWO BASKETS. UNDER SUCH CONDITIONS, WE WOULD RAISE NO OBJECTIONS.

FINALLY, MR. CHAIRMAN, MAY I SAY THAT WE NO LONGER BELIEVE WE CAN RELY ON THE SOVIETS TO REJECT OUTRIGHT PROPOSALS RELATING TO THE MEDITERRANEAN. IF THE ITALIAN PROPOSAL WERE TABLED THEREFORE, WE WOULD, IN VIEW OF OUR OBJECTION TO IT IN PRINCIPLE, BE FORCED TO CONSIDER OPPOSING IT IMMEDIATELY AND FIRMLY IN OPEN CSCE SESSION. I AM SURE WE ALL HAVE A DEEP INTEREST IN AVOIDING SUCH A PUBLIC SPLIT IN THE ALLIANCE ON A SUBJECT IN WHICH THIS GROUP OF COUNTRIES HAS A VITAL COMMON INTEREST. OBVIOUSLY WE WOULD PREFER TO AVOID THIS, AND WE THEREFORE HOPE THE NINE CAN MEET US HALFWAY IN ORDER TO FIND AN AREA OF AGREEMENT ON THIS IMPORTANT SUBJECT.

THANK YOU, MR. CHAIRMAN.

END TEXT RUMSFELD

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